Task One - The Impact of the Dawes Plan (1924) (Williamson p109-111, Farmer p37-38)
1. What were the recommendations of the Dawes Plan?
- Although the plan overall didn't alter the amount of reparations to be paid (this was secured in 1921) it did recommend a loan of 800 million gold marks, which was to be raised mainly in the USA, to assist the restoration of the German economy. This was important to the plan as it opened a way for the US to make investments in Germany.
- Annual payments were supposed to start gradually eventually rising to the full amount. These payments would be guaranteed by the the revenues of the German railways and of several key industries.
- A committee of foreign experts sitting in Berlin under the chairmanship of a US official was to ensure that the actual payments were transferred. The plan was provisional and was to be renegotiated over the next ten years.
Britain:
The Dawes plan was welcomed enthusiastically in April 1924 by the British Treasury as the 'only constructive suggestion for escape from the present position, which if left must inevitably lead to war, open or concealed, between Germany and France'. It also had the advantage of involving the USA in the whole process of extracting reparations from germany.
France:
There was much that the French disliked about the plan. For example it wasn't clear how the Germans could be made to pay reparations again if they refused to repay them as they did in 1922. However, with the defeat of poincare in June 1924 their willingness to co-operate increased considerable. If they wanted the reparations, France had no other option but to go along with the plan.
Germany:
The Germans also disliked the plan as it placed their railways and some of their industry under international control and did nothing about scaling down their debts. Stressement, after the fall of his cabinet, now foreign minister, agreed that the only way to get the French to evacuate the Ruhr was the agree to the plan.
3. What steps were taken to ensure that France would not again be able to act alone in Germany defaulted on reparation payments?
The London Conference:
Agreement to implement the Dawes plan and to withdraw French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr was achieved by the London Conference in August 1924. The new balance of power in Europe was clearly revealed when Britain and the USA devised a formula for effectively blocking France's ability to act alone against Germany if defaulted from paying their repayments again. It was agreed that Britain would have the right to appeal to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague and that a US representative would immediately join the Reparation Commission. Joint Anglo-American pressure would be enough to restrain France from Re-occupying the Ruhr. Deprived on much of their influence on the Reparation Commission, the French had undoubtably suffered a major diplomatic defeat at the London conference.
Agreement to implement the Dawes plan and to withdraw French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr was achieved by the London Conference in August 1924. The new balance of power in Europe was clearly revealed when Britain and the USA devised a formula for effectively blocking France's ability to act alone against Germany if defaulted from paying their repayments again. It was agreed that Britain would have the right to appeal to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague and that a US representative would immediately join the Reparation Commission. Joint Anglo-American pressure would be enough to restrain France from Re-occupying the Ruhr. Deprived on much of their influence on the Reparation Commission, the French had undoubtably suffered a major diplomatic defeat at the London conference.
Task 2 - The Locarno Treaties (1925) and the 'Locarno Spirit' (Williamson 112-118, Farmer p38-39)
1. How did France seek to gain security from future German aggression?
The Dawes plan, by bringing the Ruhr crisis to an end, had, together with the German measures to stabilise the mark (hyperinflation), made Germany an attractive prospect for US investment. To a certain extent, one of the preconditions for a European economic recovery was now in place, but investments was to come from individual banks and was now guaranteed by the US government. Nor was it accompanied by offers of military security to the French. Thus, should a new economic crisis blow up, US money could melt away and France could be left facing a strong and aggressive Germany.
Initially, the French had little choice but to insist on the literal implementation of the Treaty of Versailles. They refused, for instance, to agree to the evacuation of the the Cologne Zone which was due jan 1925 on the grounds that Germany had not yet carried out the military clauses of the treaty 'either in spirit or in the letter'.
2. What were the terms of the Locarno Treaties?
Initially, the French had little choice but to insist on the literal implementation of the Treaty of Versailles. They refused, for instance, to agree to the evacuation of the the Cologne Zone which was due jan 1925 on the grounds that Germany had not yet carried out the military clauses of the treaty 'either in spirit or in the letter'.
2. What were the terms of the Locarno Treaties?
The urgent need to reassure the French of Germany's peaceful intentions, and so secure the evacuation of Cologne, prompted Gustav Stresemann, on the unofficial advice of Britain ambassador in Berlin, to put forward a complex scheme for an international guaratee by the European great powers of the Rhineland and of the status quo in western Europe.
Austen Chamberlain the British Foreign Secretary, at first suspected the proposals of being an attempt to divide france and Britain. Then he rapidly grasped that it was potentially a marvellous opportunity to square the circle by achieving both french security and the evacuation of Cologne without committing Britain to a military pact with France, which the cabinet would never tolerate. Aristide Briand, now back in power, was aware that only within the framework by stresemann could be in any way commit to Britain to coming to the assistance of France if it were again attacked by Germany.
In the ensuing negotiations Briand successfully persuaded Chamberlain and Stresemann to widen the international guarantee to cover the Belgian-German frontier. He also attempted to extend it to Germanys eastern frontiers, but this was rejected by both Stresemann and Chamberlain. However, Stresemann did undertake to refer disputes with Poland and Czechoslovakia to arbitration, although he refused to recognise their frontiers with Germany as permanent. Chamberlain was quite specific that it was in Britain's interests only to guarantee that status quo in western Europe. He told the House of Commons on November 1925, in words that were to return to haunt the British government, that extending the guarantee to the Polish corridor would not be worth 'the bones if a British grenadier'.
The negotiations were completed at the Locarno Conference 5-16 October 1925, and resulted in a number of treaties that were signed on December 1st. The most important of these were agreements confirming he inviolability of the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontiers and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland.
The treaties were underwritten by an anglo-italian Guarantee to assist the victims of aggression. If relatively minor incident on one of the frontiers covered by the Locarno occurred, the uninjured part (for example, France) would first appeal to the council of the League of Nations and if the complaint was upheld, the guarantors would assist the injured state to secure compensation from the aggressor (for example, Germany). In the event of a serious violation of the treaty the guarantors could act immediately, although they would still eventually refer the issue to the council.
3. What did Britain, France and Germany gain from the Locarno agreements?
Throughout western Europe and the USA the Locarno Treaties were greeted with enormous enthusiasm. It appeared as if real peace had at last come. Had France now achieved the security it had for so long been seeking? Of all the great powers the French gained least from Locarno. It is true that Frances eastern frontiers was now secure, but under Locarno it would no longer threaten to occupy the Ruhr in order to bring pressure to bear on Berlin in the event of Germany breaking the Treaty of Versailles. The british managed to give France the illusion of security but the provision of referring all but major violations of the Locarno Agreements to the League before taking action ensured that he British government would in practice be able to determine, through its own representative on the council, what action, if any, it should take. For britain there were two main advantages to LocarnoL it tied France down and prevented it from repeating the Ruhr occupation. Also, by improving relations between Germany and the Western powers and by holding out the prospect any close co-operation between Moscow and Berlin.
Locarno was deeply unpopular with the German nationalists, but for Stresemann it was the key to the gradual process of revising the treaty.
By assuring Germany of peace in the west, and by not placing its eastern frontiers with Poland under international guarantee, Locarno left open the eventual possibility of revision of the German-Polish frontier. Stresemann's aims were therefore diametrically opposed to briands, but both desired peace and therein lay the real importance of Locarno. It was a symbol of a new age of reconciliation and co-operation. Locarno, as Ramsay MacDonald, the leader of the British Labour party, observed, brought about a 'miraculous change' pf psychology on the continent.
4. To what extent did the Locarno treaties lead to a revision of the Treaty of Versailles?
The 'Locarno Spirit' was an elusive concept which was interpreted differently on London, Paris and Berlin. All three powers agreed that it involved goodwill and concessions, yet the scope and timing of these concessions were a matter of constant and often bitter debate. Both stresemann and Briand had to convince their countrymen that the Locarno policy was working. Briand had to show that the was not giving too much away, while Stresemann had to satisfy German public opinion that his policy of 'fulfilment' was resulting in real concessions from the ex allies. It can be argued that the survival not only if Stresemann's policy but of the German Republic itself depended on ever more ambitious diplomatic success. What would happen once these were unobtainable.
5. How much had Stresemann achieved by the end of 1927?
The atmosphere of Detente created by Locarno quickly led to the evacuation of the Cologne zone in January 1926, and in September 1926 Germany at last joined the League of Nations and received a permanent seat on the council.
Stresemann exploited every opportunity both inside and outside the league to accelerate the revision of revision of Versailles. In 1926 he attempted to exploit Frances financial weakness by proposing that Germany pay the French financial weakness by proposing that Germany pay the French nearly one and a half billion gold marks, most of which Germany would raise in the USA by the sale of bonds. In return France would evacuate the Rhineland and give back the Saar and its coalmines to Germany. Despite initial interest, the plan rejected in December. The French governments financee had, contrary to expectations, improved, and it also emerged that the US government was not ready to approve the sale of more German bonds to US investors.
Stresemann did, however, manage to extract further concessions from both Britain and France. In January 1927 the Allied Disarmament Commission was withdrawn from Germany, and in the following August Britain, France and Belgium withdrew a further 10,000 troops from their garrisons in the Rhineland.
6. What did Stresemann achieve in the Hague Conference of 1929?
Austen Chamberlain the British Foreign Secretary, at first suspected the proposals of being an attempt to divide france and Britain. Then he rapidly grasped that it was potentially a marvellous opportunity to square the circle by achieving both french security and the evacuation of Cologne without committing Britain to a military pact with France, which the cabinet would never tolerate. Aristide Briand, now back in power, was aware that only within the framework by stresemann could be in any way commit to Britain to coming to the assistance of France if it were again attacked by Germany.
In the ensuing negotiations Briand successfully persuaded Chamberlain and Stresemann to widen the international guarantee to cover the Belgian-German frontier. He also attempted to extend it to Germanys eastern frontiers, but this was rejected by both Stresemann and Chamberlain. However, Stresemann did undertake to refer disputes with Poland and Czechoslovakia to arbitration, although he refused to recognise their frontiers with Germany as permanent. Chamberlain was quite specific that it was in Britain's interests only to guarantee that status quo in western Europe. He told the House of Commons on November 1925, in words that were to return to haunt the British government, that extending the guarantee to the Polish corridor would not be worth 'the bones if a British grenadier'.
The negotiations were completed at the Locarno Conference 5-16 October 1925, and resulted in a number of treaties that were signed on December 1st. The most important of these were agreements confirming he inviolability of the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontiers and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland.
The treaties were underwritten by an anglo-italian Guarantee to assist the victims of aggression. If relatively minor incident on one of the frontiers covered by the Locarno occurred, the uninjured part (for example, France) would first appeal to the council of the League of Nations and if the complaint was upheld, the guarantors would assist the injured state to secure compensation from the aggressor (for example, Germany). In the event of a serious violation of the treaty the guarantors could act immediately, although they would still eventually refer the issue to the council.
3. What did Britain, France and Germany gain from the Locarno agreements?
Throughout western Europe and the USA the Locarno Treaties were greeted with enormous enthusiasm. It appeared as if real peace had at last come. Had France now achieved the security it had for so long been seeking? Of all the great powers the French gained least from Locarno. It is true that Frances eastern frontiers was now secure, but under Locarno it would no longer threaten to occupy the Ruhr in order to bring pressure to bear on Berlin in the event of Germany breaking the Treaty of Versailles. The british managed to give France the illusion of security but the provision of referring all but major violations of the Locarno Agreements to the League before taking action ensured that he British government would in practice be able to determine, through its own representative on the council, what action, if any, it should take. For britain there were two main advantages to LocarnoL it tied France down and prevented it from repeating the Ruhr occupation. Also, by improving relations between Germany and the Western powers and by holding out the prospect any close co-operation between Moscow and Berlin.
Locarno was deeply unpopular with the German nationalists, but for Stresemann it was the key to the gradual process of revising the treaty.
By assuring Germany of peace in the west, and by not placing its eastern frontiers with Poland under international guarantee, Locarno left open the eventual possibility of revision of the German-Polish frontier. Stresemann's aims were therefore diametrically opposed to briands, but both desired peace and therein lay the real importance of Locarno. It was a symbol of a new age of reconciliation and co-operation. Locarno, as Ramsay MacDonald, the leader of the British Labour party, observed, brought about a 'miraculous change' pf psychology on the continent.
4. To what extent did the Locarno treaties lead to a revision of the Treaty of Versailles?
The 'Locarno Spirit' was an elusive concept which was interpreted differently on London, Paris and Berlin. All three powers agreed that it involved goodwill and concessions, yet the scope and timing of these concessions were a matter of constant and often bitter debate. Both stresemann and Briand had to convince their countrymen that the Locarno policy was working. Briand had to show that the was not giving too much away, while Stresemann had to satisfy German public opinion that his policy of 'fulfilment' was resulting in real concessions from the ex allies. It can be argued that the survival not only if Stresemann's policy but of the German Republic itself depended on ever more ambitious diplomatic success. What would happen once these were unobtainable.
5. How much had Stresemann achieved by the end of 1927?
The atmosphere of Detente created by Locarno quickly led to the evacuation of the Cologne zone in January 1926, and in September 1926 Germany at last joined the League of Nations and received a permanent seat on the council.
Stresemann exploited every opportunity both inside and outside the league to accelerate the revision of revision of Versailles. In 1926 he attempted to exploit Frances financial weakness by proposing that Germany pay the French financial weakness by proposing that Germany pay the French nearly one and a half billion gold marks, most of which Germany would raise in the USA by the sale of bonds. In return France would evacuate the Rhineland and give back the Saar and its coalmines to Germany. Despite initial interest, the plan rejected in December. The French governments financee had, contrary to expectations, improved, and it also emerged that the US government was not ready to approve the sale of more German bonds to US investors.
Stresemann did, however, manage to extract further concessions from both Britain and France. In January 1927 the Allied Disarmament Commission was withdrawn from Germany, and in the following August Britain, France and Belgium withdrew a further 10,000 troops from their garrisons in the Rhineland.
6. What did Stresemann achieve in the Hague Conference of 1929?
Two years later Stresemann achieved his greatest success when he managed to negotiate a permanent reduction in reparations with an Anglo-French evacuation of the Rhineland five years before the Treaty of Versailles required it. At the Hague conference in 1929 the overall reparation sum was reduced from 132 billion gold marks to 112 billion, to be paid over the course of 59 years and Britain and France agreed to evacuate the Rhineland in 1930.
The agreement to end the Rhineland occupation helped to make the young plan acceptable in Germany, but even so in December the government faced a referendum forced on them by the Nazi and Nationalist parties declaring that its signature would be an act of high treason on the grounds that Germany was still committed to paying reparations. This was easily defeated and the Young plan was officially implemented on 20th January 1930.
The agreement to end the Rhineland occupation helped to make the young plan acceptable in Germany, but even so in December the government faced a referendum forced on them by the Nazi and Nationalist parties declaring that its signature would be an act of high treason on the grounds that Germany was still committed to paying reparations. This was easily defeated and the Young plan was officially implemented on 20th January 1930.
7. Why did Briand's proposals for a European federation fail?
With the evacuation of the Rhineland, Germanys restoration to the status of a great european power was virtually complete. Briand, like his successors in the 1950s, appears to have come to the conclusion that Germany could only be peacefully contained through some form of European federation. At the tenth assembly of the League of Nations in 1929, he outlined an ambitious, but vague scheme for creating 'some kind of federal link.. between the peoples of Europe'.
Streseman reacted favourably and urged both a European customs union and a common currency. Briand was then entrusted by the 27 European members of the league with the task of formulating his plan more precisely; but when it was circulated to the chancelleries of Europe in May 1930, the whole economic and political climate had dramatically changed.
Stresemann had died and the political crisis in Germany caused by the onset of the depression brought to power a government under Heinrich Bruning that was more interested in a customs union with Austria than in European federation. The German cabinet finally rejected the memorandum on July 8th 1930. A week later it was also rejected by Britain.
It is tempting to argue that Briands plans for european federation, which were killed off by economic crisis that was eventually to bring hitler to power, was one of the lost opportunities of history. On the other hand, it would be mistake to view them through the eyes of early twenty-first century European federalists. Essentially, Stresemann hoped that it would have the opposite effect. Perhaps under favourable circumstances it could have at least provided a framework within Franco-German differences that could have been solved.
8. What were the aims of the Russian foreign policy towards Germany in 1924-1929?
The Soviet government, which after the death of Lenin in January 1924 increasingly fell under the control of Stalin, viewed progress made in stabilising western Europe through the Dawes Plan and the Locarno Agreements with both hostility and dismay. It feared this would strengthen the anti-bolshevik forces in Europe and delay revolution in Germany, which they wanted, as this would turn them communist. The Russians initially attempted the deflect Stresemann from his Locarno policy, first with an offer if a military alliance against Poland, and then, when that failed, with a contradictory threat of joining with France to guarantee Poland's western frontiers.
Stresemann aware of Russia's attempts to stir up revolution in Germany in 1923, was not ready to abandon the Locarno policy, but he was anxious to keep open his links with Moscow and consolidate the Rapallo Agreement of 1922, if only as a possible insurance against Anglo-French pressure in the west. Thus, the Russians were able to first negotiate a commercial treaty with Germany in October 1925. Then in April 1926 at the time when the Poles and the french were trying to delay Germanys membership of the league council, they persuaded Stresemann to sign the German-soviet treaty of Friendship (the Berlin Treaty). This was essentially a neutrality pack in which both powers agreed to remain neutral if wither party was attacked by a third power.
9. Why were the relations so bad between Britain and Russia 1924-1929? (Farmer p29-34)
Relations between Russia and Britain sharply deteriorated when the incoming conservative government refused in October 1924 to ratify the Anglo-General Treaty which had been negotiated by the outgoing Labour administration. In 1927, after ordering a raid on the offices of the official soviet trading company, Arcos, in an attempt to discover evidence of the espionage, the British government served all official relations with Russia.
Only in 1929, with the return of Labour, were ambassadors agains exchanged. This outbreak of the first 'Anglo-Soviet cold war', as the American historian Jacobson has called it, strengthened Stalins determination to cut Russia off from the West. Increasingly, the main thrust of Soviet foreign policy in the late 1920s was to exploit anti-western feelings in the middle east, china and india.
Streseman reacted favourably and urged both a European customs union and a common currency. Briand was then entrusted by the 27 European members of the league with the task of formulating his plan more precisely; but when it was circulated to the chancelleries of Europe in May 1930, the whole economic and political climate had dramatically changed.
Stresemann had died and the political crisis in Germany caused by the onset of the depression brought to power a government under Heinrich Bruning that was more interested in a customs union with Austria than in European federation. The German cabinet finally rejected the memorandum on July 8th 1930. A week later it was also rejected by Britain.
It is tempting to argue that Briands plans for european federation, which were killed off by economic crisis that was eventually to bring hitler to power, was one of the lost opportunities of history. On the other hand, it would be mistake to view them through the eyes of early twenty-first century European federalists. Essentially, Stresemann hoped that it would have the opposite effect. Perhaps under favourable circumstances it could have at least provided a framework within Franco-German differences that could have been solved.
8. What were the aims of the Russian foreign policy towards Germany in 1924-1929?
The Soviet government, which after the death of Lenin in January 1924 increasingly fell under the control of Stalin, viewed progress made in stabilising western Europe through the Dawes Plan and the Locarno Agreements with both hostility and dismay. It feared this would strengthen the anti-bolshevik forces in Europe and delay revolution in Germany, which they wanted, as this would turn them communist. The Russians initially attempted the deflect Stresemann from his Locarno policy, first with an offer if a military alliance against Poland, and then, when that failed, with a contradictory threat of joining with France to guarantee Poland's western frontiers.
Stresemann aware of Russia's attempts to stir up revolution in Germany in 1923, was not ready to abandon the Locarno policy, but he was anxious to keep open his links with Moscow and consolidate the Rapallo Agreement of 1922, if only as a possible insurance against Anglo-French pressure in the west. Thus, the Russians were able to first negotiate a commercial treaty with Germany in October 1925. Then in April 1926 at the time when the Poles and the french were trying to delay Germanys membership of the league council, they persuaded Stresemann to sign the German-soviet treaty of Friendship (the Berlin Treaty). This was essentially a neutrality pack in which both powers agreed to remain neutral if wither party was attacked by a third power.
9. Why were the relations so bad between Britain and Russia 1924-1929? (Farmer p29-34)
Relations between Russia and Britain sharply deteriorated when the incoming conservative government refused in October 1924 to ratify the Anglo-General Treaty which had been negotiated by the outgoing Labour administration. In 1927, after ordering a raid on the offices of the official soviet trading company, Arcos, in an attempt to discover evidence of the espionage, the British government served all official relations with Russia.
Only in 1929, with the return of Labour, were ambassadors agains exchanged. This outbreak of the first 'Anglo-Soviet cold war', as the American historian Jacobson has called it, strengthened Stalins determination to cut Russia off from the West. Increasingly, the main thrust of Soviet foreign policy in the late 1920s was to exploit anti-western feelings in the middle east, china and india.
Italy had looked to the pace settlement to give it large amounts of territory that it had been promised when it entered the war, compensating for its heavy losses and making Italy the great power that it had always yearned to be. Yet the peace settlement failed to provide, causing resentment in Italy.
In 1922 Benito Mussolini, leader of the Fascist Party (an anti-communist movement), seized power in Rome. He demanded revision of the peace settlement and talked of making Italy an imperial power. He soon showed that he was prepared to involve himself in dramatic foreign policy escapades. His ambitions in the Mediterranean, which he regarded as the Italian lake, seemed to pose a direct threat to the British Empire as it was a vital link in it's worldwide communication chain.
However for most of the 1920s Mussolini kept a relatively low profile. He won some modest gains in Africa, succeeded in annexing the port Fiume on the border of Yugoslavia, and strengthened Italy's hold over Albania. Neither Mussolini nor fascism posed a serious threat in the 1920s. Indeed, some British statesmen, including Churchill and Lloyd George, expressed admiration towards Mussolini's achievements in Italy.
11. To what extent did France consolidate its influence in Eastern Europe?
With the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War, France replaced its former alliance with Tsarist Russia with a series of new alliance in eastern Europe.
- March 1921: Alliance with Poland - hated by Russia and Germany and on bad terms with Czechoslovakia and Lithuania and therefore was the weakest of the the eastern European states. However they failed to persuade Stresemann to agree to a guarantee of Poland's frontiers or to ensure Poland gained a permanent seat on the League council.
- August 1920: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia signed a treaty and became known as the 'Little Entente'. They were later joined by Romania in 1921. It was primarily against Hungary, designed to stop the return of the Habsburgs and the revision of the Trianon Treaty. France was not successful in organising these states.
- 1924: French and Czech agreement, however this was not strictly an anti-German alignment. It would only come into use in the event of a restoration of the royal families of Austria or Germany or of an Austrian Anschluss with Germany.
- 1926: French and Romanian agreement, guaranteeing its frontiers against the threat of Italian influence in Albania.
- 1927: Treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia
Task Three - The League Of Nations
1. How did the League of Nations work?
The league was one of the outcomes of the Treaty of Versailles. It had its headquarters in Geneva. The Assembly of the League, composed of representatives of all the member states, met yearly and each state had one vote. Britain, France, Italy and Japan had permanent seats on the Council of the League. The Assembly could then elect 4 (later 6) further members of the Council. The Council made most of the Leagues decisions. By the Covenant of the League, member states agreed to a number of Articles. The most important being Article 16 which stated that if any member of the League resorted to war, other states should impose economic sanctions (refusing to trade with a particular country), and if necessary take military action. The initial members of the League were the 32 Allied states which had signed the peace treaties and 12 neutral states. By 1926 all ex-enemy states including Germany had joined, but soviet Russia did not do so until 1934, and the USA never did.
2. What roles did the organs of the League of Nations play?
The Assembly:
Essentially a deliberate chamber (appointed to debate or discuss issues) where each state, regardless of its size, was allotted three representatives.
The Council:
In 1920 the Council had four permanent members: Britain, France, Italy and Japan. In 1926 Germany joined. The smaller states were represented by a changing rota of four temporary members, later increased to seven, who were all selected by the Assembly. As the Council met more frequently than the Assembly and was dominated by the great powers, it gradually developed as an executive committee or cabinet of the Assembly. It worked out the details and implementations of policies which the Assembly had endorsed in principle. Decisions in both bodies were normally taken by unanimous vote.
Permanent Secretariat:
The routine administrative work of the League was carried out by the Permanent Secretariat which was staffed by a relatively small international civil service.
Permanent Court of International Justice:
In 1921 a fourth organ was added to the League when the Permanent Court of International Justice was set up at the Hague in the Netherlands with the task of both advising the council on legal matters and judging cases submitted to it by individual states.
3. How effective were the League's powers for solving international disputes?
The heart of the covenant, Articles 8-17, was primarily concerned with the overriding question of the prevention of war. The process for solving disputes between sovereign powers was defined in Articles 12-17. Initially (Article 12) disputes were to be submitted to some form of arbitration or inquiring by the League. While this was happening, there was to be a cooling off period for 3 months. By Article 13 members were committed to carrying out the judgements of the Permanent Court of International Justice or the recommendations of the Council. The Council was empowered by Article 15 to set up an enquiry into the origin of the dispute. The assumption in these Articles was that the states would be only too willing to eliminate war by making use of the League's arbitration machinery.
In Article 17 the League's powers were significantly extended by its right intervene in disputes between non-members of the League, while in Article 11 member states were encouraged to refer to the Assembly or Council any international problem which might threaten the peace.
In theory the League had formidable power. The League's existence was based on the recognition of the political and territorial independence of all member states. However there were several gaps in the League Covenant which allowed a potential aggressor to wage war without sanction. War had to be officially declared before the League could act effectively. It had no formula for dealing with acts of guerrilla warfare. Even in the event of a formal declaration of war, if the International Court or the Council could not agree on a verdict, then League members were free to continue with their war.
4. What problems faced the league in the 1920s?
In January 1920 the governments of the Great Power viewed the League with open hostility. The French doubted its ability to outlaw war, whilst Germany saw it as a means for enforcing the much hated Treaty of Versailles. For a short time after the Republican victory in November 1920, the US disliked the League and its officials were instructed to avoid any co-operation with the organisation.
Under the Treaty of Versailles, the League was responsible for the administration of the Saar and Danzig. This inevitably involved the danger of it becoming too closely associated with the policy of the Allies. In the Saar, it made the mistake appointing a French chairman to the governing commission which then administrated the territory in the interests of France. The league was also the guarantor of the agreements, signed by the Allies and the successor states created in 1919, which were aimed at ensuring that the various racial minorities left isolated behind the new frontiers enjoyed full civil rights.
When the Allies distributed the former German and Turkish territories among themselves, they were divided into three groups according to how developed they were. The most advanced were in the Middle East and the least were in the islands of the pacific. The League's greatest task was to avoid becoming a façade for colonialism in a new form. Thus, mandate powers were required to send in annual reports on their territories to the Leagues Permanent Mandates Commissions, which quickly gained a formidable reputation for its expertise and authority. This therefore forced the imperialist powers with moral pressure to consider the interests of the native populations.
5. How effective was the League's welfare, medical and economic work?
Economic work:
Although the League was excluded from dealing with reparations and war debts, in 1922 its Financial Committee was entrusted by the Allied leaders with the task of rebuilding Austria and Hungary's economy. The Committee had an even greater task of attempting to persuade the powers to abolish protection and create a worldwide free trade zone. It organised two worldwide economic conferences (1927 & 1933), which both Russia and the US attended. However it failed to make any progress towards free trade.
The International Labour Organisation:
This was first created as an independent organisation by the Treaty of Versailles, but was financed by the League. In some ways it was a miniature League. It had its own permanent labour office at Geneva, staffed by 1000 officials. Its work was discussed annually by a conference of Labour delegates. Right up to 1939 the ILO turned out an impressive stream of reports, recommendations and statistics which provided important information for a wide range of industries all over the world.
Health Organisation:
The League's Health Organisation Provided an invaluable forum for drawing up common policies on such matters as the treatment of diseases, the design of hospitals and health education. The League also set up committees to advise on limiting the production of opium and other addictive drugs, on the outlawing of the sale of women and children for prostitution and on the effective abolition of slavery.
6. How effective was the League in solving international disputes 1920-25?
Successes:
- Teschen 1920: Teschen had been one of the wealthiest and most industrialised regions of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1919, violence erupted between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Poland claimed the region on the grounds that 55% of the population was Polish. Czechoslovakia based it claim on historical arguments. The League split the region between the two countries in 1920, both accepted the decision and the fighting ceased.
- The Aaland Islands 1921: There were disputes over the Aalands (situated between Sweden and Finland) in 1921. The population was exclusively Swedish speaking, yet belonged to Finland since the early 1900s. Most inhabitants wanted the land to belong to Sweden, and after Sweden raised the issue with the League the land was given to Finland.
- Upper Silesia 1921: The people of Upper Silesia were divided on whether they wanted to be part of Poland or Germany, leading to a series of local riots between 1919 and 1921. The League decided that it would be split between the two nations, a choice that was accepted by the people.
- Yugoslavia- Albania border dispute 1921: The League was confronted with open warfare between Yugoslavia and Albania when Yugoslav troops entered Albanian territory in November 1921. The League sent a commission, made up of representatives from Britain, France, Italy and Japan, to investigate the cause of the disagreement. They found in favour of Albania and Yugoslavia had to withdraw its troops.
- Memel 1923: The port of Memel and the surrounding are were placed under the control of the League if Nations under the Treaty of Versailles. However Lithuania claimed the region and invaded in 1923. The League decided that the area around the port should go to Lithuania and Memel itself should remain an international zone.
- Mosul 1924: Mosul had been part of the Turkish Empire until 1918. As a result of the Paris Peace settlement, Mosul became part of the British mandate of Iraq. Turkey demanded that it should be allowed to regain control of the region but, in 1924, the League found in favour of Iraq.
- Greece-Bulgaria border dispute 1925: Greece invaded Bulgaria in 1925. Bulgaria referred the matter to the League on Nations and ordered its troops to offer only small resistance in order to avoid conflict, a clear indication that Bulgaria had faith in the League. The League condemned the invasion and called for Greece to withdraw and pay compensation to Bulgaria.
- Leticia 1933-34: Leticia lay on the border between Columbia and Peru. Following a series of border disputes, in 1922 Peru agreed that the Leticia region should belong to Columbia. Peruvian businessmen, whose rubber and sugar industries had been affected, were angered by this decision. Under pressure from these powerful businessmen, the government of Peru ordered the occupation of Leticia in 1932, resulting in war with Columbia. Both countries agreed to mediation by the League of Nations and in May 1933 the League took control of the disputed region. By May 1934, an agreement had been reached and Leticia was returned to Columbia.
- The International Labour Organisation: This was created and financed by the League, and had success in improving working conditions around the world. Governments were persuaded to fix minimum working hours, to establish minimum wage levels, to provide sickness and unemployment benefits and to introduce old age pensions.
- Commission for Refugees: Helped to resettle over 500,000 former prisoners of war who had been stranded in Russia at the end of WW1. In 1922, the Commission was responsible for introducing the Nansen passport - the first internationally recognised identity card for stateless refugees. When violence erupted in Turkey during 1923, the Commission helped to find homes, food and jobs for 1.5 million refugees and after 1933, considerable assistance was provided to the many thousands of people fleeing Nazi Germany.
- The Health Organisation: Achieved a great deal in investigating the causes and possible preventions of epidemics. It was successful in combating a typhus epidemic in Russia, and undertook research on diseases such as leprosy.
- The Mandates Commission: Supervised the territories of the former German and Turkish Empires. It ensured that these territories were both well-governed and adequately prepared for their own independent.
- Financial assistance: e.g The League arranged loans for Austria and Hungary after they became bankrupt and advised them on how best to spend the money.
- They also played a significant role in dealing with issues such as the exploitation of women and children, drug trafficking and slavery.
Failures:
- Vilna 1920: Polish troops occupied Vilna, capital of Lithuania. Following a request from Lithuania, the League ordered Poland to remove its troops and tried to arrange a plebiscite to determine the future of the land. Poland initially agreed, but then reinforced its troops and annexed the city. The main reason for this failure was because both Britain and France supported Polish claim to the region.
- Treaty of Riga 1921: In 1920, Poland invaded Russian territory. By 1921 the Russians had to sign the Treaty of Riga, giving Poland 31,000 square miles of land, as neither Britain or France had any interest in defending Russia.
- Invasion of the Ruhr 1923: France and Belgium invaded the Ruhr after Germany failed to pat reparations. Since the Council had to be unanimous (and France and Belgium were members) the League could not take action.
- Corfu Incident 1923: In 1923 Italy blamed Greece for the death of three Italian officials monitoring the borer between Greece and Albania. Mussolini demanded compensation and occupied Corfu. Greece appealed to the League which ordered Italy to withdraw. mussolini refused and threatened to leave the League. The Council then decided that Greece should pay compensation, exposing the fact that the as a member of the council, Italy was in a position to prevent the League from taking action, and also the Leagues decision was overruled by another body - the League of Ambassadors.
- Japanese Invasion of Manchuria 1931: Japan invaded in 1931 and China appealed to the League, which ordered Japan to withdraw. When Japan refused, a commission was sent to investigate the cause of the dispute. The commission reported fault on both sides, and that Manchuria should be governed by the League. Japan rejected this, maintained its forces and withdrew from the League. Due to the covenant, the League should have taken action against Japan but neither Britain or France were in the positions to impose economic sanctions on Japan or to participate in a conflict as there was a worldwide depression.
- Italian Invasion of Abyssinia 1935: In 1935 Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, which the League condemned as an act of aggression and thus imposed economic sanctions on Italy, however they did not apply to key resources such as oil, steel and coal. The sanctions had little effect and were soon abandoned, with Mussolini free to continue and to withdraw Italy's membership.
- Spanish Civil War 1936-39: The Spanish government appealed to League to deal with a nationalist rising in Spain. However the League was not prepared to intervene in an 'internal Spanish matter'.
- Japanese Invasion of China 1937: Japan lead a full scale invasion on China, and the Chinese appeals to the League were met with sympathy yet little assistance, as their own economies suffered and the majority of nations were desperate to avoid taking action that might lead to war.
Task Four - Progress Made Towards Disarmament
1. Why did Britain reject the Geneva Protocol of 1924?
One of the major tasks of the League was to work out an acceptable word disarmament programme. However disarmament could not be divorced from the question of security. To solve this problem the League drafted an ambitious collective security agreement in 1924, the Geneva Protocol, but this was rejected by Britain, who feared that it would commit it to policing the world. 2. What was agreed at the Washington Four Power Treaty and Naval Conference of 1922?
With the US outside of the League the twin problems of growing Anglo-American naval rivalry and deteriorating American-Japanese relations in the Pacific could only be tackled by negotiations between the powers concerned. By 1919 the US had become alarmed at the rise of Japanese power in the Pacific. Japan had begun a naval construction programme and in response the US formed a Pacific fleet and embarked on their own naval scheme that, if completed, would give the US the largest navy in the world. This then pushed Britain in 1921 into announcing it's own naval programme, but privately told Washington that it desired a negotiated settlement as it could not afford a naval race.
The British and Japanese alliance was due for renewal in July 1921, the powers both agreed, under pressure from Washington, to replace it by a new four-power treaty, which committed Britain, France, Japan and the USA to respect each others positions in the Pacific and to refer an disputes to the four signatory powers.
With the Anglo-Japanese Treaty out of the way, the first Washington Naval Convention was signed in February 1922 for a duration of 14 years. It halted the building of capital ships for 10 years, provided for the scrapping battleships and battle cruisers, and, for those capital ships which were spared the breaker's yard, established a ratio of 3 for Japan and 1.67 each for Italy and France to every 5 for Britain and the USA. in 1929 Britain, Japan and the USA in the London Naval Treaty agreed to extend the main principle of this agreement to smaller fighting ships.
3. How Important was the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928? From 1922 onwards the USA's attitude towards the League began to alter. The US saw the value of participating in some of the League's committees on social, economic and health matters. When the League set up a Preparatory Commission in 1926 to prepare for a world disarmament conference, both the US and Russia attended. Peace movements such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, put considerable moral pressure on the US to play a greater role in the disarmament question. In March 1927, Professor Shotwell persuaded Brian to propose a Franco-American pact that would outlaw war. Frank Kellogg, US Secretary of State, replied by suggesting a general pact between as many states as possible, rejecting war as an 'instrument of national policy'. On 27 August 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact was signed by 15 states, and by 1933 another 50 states had joined. It outlawed war, while the League had the necessary machinery for setting up commissions of inquiry and implementing cooling off periods in the event of dispute. However it could be said that, as it did not commit its members, it would just give the US moral basis on which it could intervene with world affairs, should it desire to do so.
4. Why did the World Disarmament Conference of 1932-34 fail?
In 1930, the Preparatory Commission, after protracted discussions on different models of disarmament, produced its final draft draft for an international convention. The League council called the long-awaited World Disarmament Conference in February 1932 at Geneva. It could not have been convened at a worse time: the Manchurian Crisis had weakened the League, the rise of a nationalism in Germany was making France and Poland less likely to compromise over German demands for equality in armaments, while the impact of the depression on the USA was reviving the isolationist tendencies of the early 1920s. Long before the Germans withdrew in November 1933 it was clear that the conference would fail.
No comments:
Post a Comment