NOTES: Countdown to the War in Asia 1931-1941

Task 1 - Japan 1918-1930 

1. What was Japan position in 1918? 

China's steady disintegration during the 19th century caused alarm in Japan. There was a real possibility that the western powers, particularly Russia, might try to take advantage of China's plight by gaining political as well as economic control over East Asia. At the same time, however, Chinas decline also provided Japan with the opportunity to extend its own influence in the area. As a relatively small country with a rapidly expanding population, Japan could see a major advantages in gaining more territory. It was this mixture of fear and ambition that led Japan into wars with China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905). The same motives had inspired Japans conquest of Maiwan (1894). South Manchuria (1905) and Korea (1910).

Japanese expansion in East Asia was of grave concern to the Western powers, which were keen to protect and extend their own trading activities in the region. The USA in particular saw Japan as a threat to its 'open door' policy of trading activities in China. Any further ambitions Japan might have had in the region were therefore kept in check by the west. This situation was fundamentally changed by the First World War, which provided Japan with unique opportunity to expand its power and influence in the far east. 

2. What Was Agreed at the Washington Naval Conference 1921-1922? 

Japan emerged from the First World War in a very strong position. It was now a wealthy nation with an efficient, modern industrial sector, a powerful navy and increased influence over China. The USA was deeply concerned by the rapid growth in the Japanese navy and, for a time, a naval arms race between the two countries seemed likely. To address concern, the Washington Naval Conference took place in 1921-1922. This led to a series of agreements:

• The Japanese navy would be limited to three-fifths the size of the US and British fleets.
• A four Power Treaty was signed by Britain, the USA, France and Japan, by which each country agreed to respect the others rights in the pacific and far east. This treaty formally ended the 1902 alliance between Britain and Japan. Britain had become increasingly embarrassed by this friendship, especially since the reason for it (naval rivalry with Germany) no longer existed. 
• A Nine Power Treaty guaranteed protection for China against invasion and agreed to uphold the 'open-door' policy. This agreement was made between Britain, the USA, France and Japan and some smaller countries that had interests in the far east, including the Netherlands. 

Before the Washington Conference, Japan has followed a policy of expansionism in the far east. Historians disagree about the reasons why Japan was prepared to abandon this policy and accept the international agreements reached in Washington. Some claimed that, confronted by the combined power of Britain and the USA, the Japanese realised that they had little choice but to reach an agreement. In particular, there were simply no way Japan could win  a naval arms race against the USA. However, the opposing view is that rather than being forced into it, Japan reached agreement because it genuinely wanted to. Many Japanese politicians, such as Kijuro Shidehara, realised that such multinational co-operation would not only guarantee Japans security but also enable it to continue its economic expansion in China. 

Japan seemed to be changing in other ways, too. It began to adopt a more democratic system of government and, in 1925, all adult males were given the right to vote. New politicians parties, more concerned with domestic reform than pursuing a militaristic foreign policy, were beginning to emerge. However, just as in Italy, Germany and Spain, problems began to emerge during the 1920s and early 1930s - problems that democratically elected governments seemed incapable of overcoming. 

3. Why was the Democracy in Japan short lived? 

As dispute raged both between and within politics parties, military leaders grew increasingly powerful. Secret military groups were organised, such as the Sakurakai (Cherry Blossom Society), established in 1930. Their aim was to end party politics and restore the emperor as the end of state in a military dictatorship. Concerned that politicians were diving rather than uniting their country, many people in Japan grey increasingly supportive of the aims of such groups. By the early 1930s, Japans flirtation with democracy was coming to an end for a variety of reasons:

• The constitution that created an elected diet that only had been adopted in 1889, prior to which the emperor had supreme power in Japan. The idea of democracy was thus still relatively new to the Japanese people. Moreover, the emperor had the authority to dissolve the Diet at any time.
• The Japanese peoples respect in parliamentary democracy declined very quickly when it became evident that many politicians were corrupt and open to bribery. 
• The agreements that Japan signed as a result of the Washington Naval Conference were not popular. Most Japanese citizens were strongly nationalistic and held anti-western views that did not fit well with their governments willingness to co-operate with the USA and the major European nations. 
• Army and navy leaders felt that the Japanese government was being too 'soft' on China, and that Chinas weakness should be exploited to allow for Japanese expansion.
• The economic boom Japan experienced as a result of the first World War had ended in 1921. By this time, European industry had revived and was beginning to recover lost markets. Unemployment began to rise in the industrial cities of Japan. At the same time, farmers were hit by falling prices. Attempts by industrial workers and farmers to form political organisations were systematically suppressed by the government. 
• Japan was particularly badly hit by the world economic crisis that followed the Wall Street Crash. Japanese exports dropped alarmingly, leading to further unemployment As poverty spread across much of their country, most Japanese people blamed the government for their misfortunes. 

Task 2 - The Manchurian Crisis 

Arguably, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 was a continuations of policies followed by Japanese governments since the defeat of Russia in 1905 when Japan had been awarded the lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the right to protect it with some 15,000 troops. In the late 1920s these concessions were threatened by the turmoil caused by the Chinese Civil War, which broke outing 1927 and was fought between the Nationalists and Communists.

1. Why did the Japanese occupy Manchuria?

The failure of the Japanese government to deal with the impact of the Depression on the economy convinced the Japanese officer corps that it would have to act decisively and occupy the whole of Manchuria. This would then enable Japan to control the regions valuable coal and iron resourced at a time when economic nationalism was already making it difficult for it to purchase these vital raw materials elsewhere. Consequently, Japanese officers in Manchuria decided to devise an incident which would provide the pretext for intervention. On September 18th 1931 a bomb exploded on the railway line just outside Mukden where both Chinese and Japanese troops were stationed. This was immediately blamed on the Chinese and provided the Japanese forces with the desired excuse to occupy not only Mukden but the whole of southern Manchuria. 

2. What was the league of nations initial response to the occupation on Manchuria's by Japan?

China immediately appealed to the League of Nations, but the council responded cautiously. It first asked Japan to withdraw its troops back into the railway zone and, when this was ignored, sent to commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton. The Japanese were able to co,plate the occupation of Manchuria and turned it into a satellite state if Manchukuo while the Lytton commission was conducting a leisurely fact-finding operations in the spring of 1932. 

3. Why were both Britain and the USA not ready to use force for the Manchuria crisis?

It is easy to critic the League for not acting more decisively, but without the commitment of the Great Powers it was not in the position to take effective action. Neither of the two most important naval powers, Britain and the USA, was ready to use force against Japan. From the Japanese point of view, the timing of the Mukden incident could not have been better. On September 15th a minor mutiny at the naval base at Invergorden, which was caused by a cut in the sailors wages, threatened temporarily to paralyse the royal navy; and five days later Britain was forced off the gold standard. The USA, shell-shocked by the depression, was unwilling to do more than denounce Japanese aggression. President Hoover, for instance, argued that economic sanctions would be like 'sticking pins in tigers' and would run the risk of leading to war.

It is sometimes argued that the British government and powerful financial interests in the city of London secretly supported Japan. It is true that Britain did have some sympathy with Japanese actions in Manchuria. Like Japan it had commercial interests in China, which it felt were threatened by the chaos and civil war there. Britain also appreciated Japans potential role in providing  a barrie against the spread of Bolshevism from the USSR into northern China. Nevertheless, the real reasons why Britain was not ready to urge more decisive action against Japan was that neither the government nor the people desired to fight a war on an issue that was not central to British interests.

4. What were the recommendations of the Lytton report?
In September 1932 the League received the Lytton Commissions report. It conceded that the treaty rights, that Japan had enjoyed in Manchuria since 1905, had made Sino-Japanese friction unavoidable, it nevertheless observed that 'without a declaration of war a large area of what was indisputably Chinese territory had been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan and has in consequence of this operation been separated from and declared independent from the rest of China'. It proposed that Japanese troops should withdraw back into the railway zone, then both China and Japan should negotiate a treaty guaranteeing Japan's right in Manchuria and a non-aggression pact and a trade agreement.
The report was mistakenly based on the assumption that Japan had no territorial designs in China and were ready to compromise over Manchuria. It was adopted unanimously, with the exception of Japan, by the League Assembly on 24 February 1933. Japan withdrew from the League in protest. It was clear that only armed intervention by the Great Powers would be able to force Japan out of Manchuria, and that option was not politically realistic in 1933.

5. What were the consequences of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria?
The Japanese occupation of Manchuria changed the balance of power in the Pacific. Japan had broken free from the restraints that had been put on it at the Washington Conference in 1922 by Britain and the USA and had guaranteed it access to valuable coal and iron ore resources. Above all, Japan was now in a favourable strategic position to plan a large-scale military invasion of China. The Manchuria incident is often seen as the first link in the chain of events that led to WW2.

Task 3 - Continued expansion and the Sino-Japanese War

1.  What were the implications of military dictatorship in Japan? 
In July 1937, the growing tension between China and Japan reached a climax when an incident at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking led to a full-scale Japanese invasion of China.
Under the Boxer Protocol of 1901, Japan and other countries had been allowed to station troops near Peking to guard important railway lines and other communications systems. On 7 July 1937, a Japanese training exercise was mistaken for genuine military action by Chinese troops and the Chinese fired on the Japanese. China immediately issued an apology but Japan declared war. The Sino-Japanese War lasted until 1945. Renewed unity between Chiang's KMT and Mao's CCP, assisted by military aid from the USSR, provided much sterner resistance than the Japanese expected.

2. What impact did the Sino-Japanese War have on Britain, France and the USA? 
Britain and the US were concerned about Japanese aggression and both considered imposing economic sanctions on Japan. However with Britain heavily involved in fighting its own war against Nazi Germany, and the USA pursuing its isolationist policy, there was no prospect of China receiving any direct any direct help from the West. Japan's military leaders why divided on what action to take. Most of them believed that the outbreak of WW2 in Europe offered an opportunity similar to that which Japan had successfully exploited between 1914 and 1918. They argued that Japan should continue its aggressive policy and seize Dutch, British and French possessions in the far east. Success against Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would provide Japan with a new source of tin, oil and rubber. However others argued a more cautious approach, as they were concerned about a possible attack by the USSR, and therefore felt that it was more important to safeguard against this than to embark on further military engagements. This dilemma ended in June 1941 when Germany invaded the Soviet Union, ending the threat of Russia on Japan, and a new PM, General Hideki Tojo, was appointed.

3. What did Japan gain from the Anti-Comintern Pact?
While the Far Eastern war increased the pressure on Britain and France, it did not automatically follow that Japan, Italy and Germany would find it easy to form a common front against the democracies. In December 1936, Germany and Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. Its value for Japan was that it could be seen as a counter-thrust to increasing Soviet penetration of Mongolia and to the activities of the Comintern in China. Tokyo could signal to Moscow that it was no longer isolated.
A year later Italy joined the Pact. Again, the advantage for Japan was that it was associated with the Axis powers in a vague and symbolic pact that was primarily anti-communist, but which potentially could also be directed against the Western Powers as well.

Task 4 - The Road to Pearl Harbor 1940-41

1. Why did US-Japanese relations deteriorate in 1940-41? 
With Germany having established a self-sufficient siege economy in Europe, it became even more important for the US to stop Japan from doing the same in Asia. Washington responded to each fresh extension of Japanese power by building up its naval forces in the Pacific and restricting the exports of potential war materials to Japan, which in turn intensified the Japanese drive for economic self-sufficiency.
There were ambiguous signals coming out of Tokyo to encourage the US State Department sometimes to believe that if sufficient economic were applied, Japan would be forced to pull out of China and the influence of the army would be discredited on its government.
In June 1940 Hitler's victories strengthened the hand of the hawks in Tokyo who advocated the occupation of the European colonies in South-east Asia. A relatively moderate government, which wished to avoid confrontation with the US, was replaced by a more anti-western regime under Fumimaro Konoe, which aimed to create a Japanese-dominated Asia. Washington responded by suspending exports of aviation fuel and lubrication oil. Japan tried to negotiate a Four-Power pact with the Axis states and the USSR. They succeeded with Germany and Italy in September and they signed a 5 year treaty of neutrality with Stalin the following Spring. But the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 terminated any prospect of a grand four-power alliance against Britain and the US. Thus the US and Japan remained on a collision course.

2. Why did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor in December 1941? 
With the denial of US oil imports Japan had to either reach a diplomatic settlement with the US or continue seizing raw materials from Southeast Asia, including oil from the Dutch East Indies. They chose to do both by pursuing diplomatic negotiations with the US whilst simultaneously preparing his armed forces for war.
On November 26 1941 Roosevelt demanded that Japan cease its military build up in the Pacific, causing Tojo to break off diplomatic relations with the USA. By then, a fleet of Japanese ships were 3 weeks into their journey towards the US naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Aboard were 6 aircraft carriers with 453 Japanese fighter planes armed with bombs and torpedoes, protected by 2 battleships, 2 cruisers and 50 other vessels. Their aim was to destroy the US Pacific fleet. On Sunday 7 December 1941, Japanese ships arrived undetected by US patrol or radar, and sent in their first wave of 183 aircraft. By 1.30 p.m, the US had lost 2402 men and 8 ships were seriously damaged.
This event ended the US obsession with isolationism as it could no longer claim that events in the wider world did not effect it. WW2 was clearly no longer a European affair. Roosevelt had long argued for US involvement in the Second World War, which at the time had been extremely unpopular, but now the American public called for revenge.
With Japan as an ally Hitler believed Germany would be invincible and consequently declared war on the USA.
In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Japan's success had been secured by the destruction of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. They believed that Pearl Harbor would similarly weaken the US by undermining their ability to fight a naval war in the Pacific. However it failed in its key objective as a number of US ships, including 3 aircraft carriers, were at sea at the time of the attack and escaped undamaged. They Japanese also failed to destroy large supplies of oil which would prove vital in supplying the US war effort. Japan's attempt to increase its power and influence in the Far East eventually brought destruction upon itself as they had made an enemy with one of the most powerful countries on earth.

NOTES: Countdown to War in Europe

Task 1 - Democracies on the Defensive 1930-1936

1. What was raw impact of the Great Depression 1929-1933 on the international situation? 

The Great Depression, triggered by the Wall Street Crash and it was a devastating blow to the progress made since 1924 towards creating a new framework for peaceful international co-operation. Economic recovery in Europe after 1924 was very dependant on shirt-term US loans, of which $4 billion went to Germany. However after the Wall Street crash, the US abruptly terminated these loans, creating a devastating blow to the rest of Europe. Between 1929 and 1932 the volume of world trade fell by 70%. Unemployment rose to 13 million in the USA, to six months in Germany and to three million in Britain, Japan was also hard hit with around 50% of its mining and heavy industrial capacity was forced to closed. 

Inevitably, an economic crisis of this size also had a large impact on politics:

• It helped Hitler rise to power in Germany in January 1933.
• In Japan it strengthened the hand of an influential group of army officers who argued that only by seizing Manchuria could Japan recover from the slump. 
• In Italy it prompted Mussolini to have plans drawn up for the conquest of Abyssinia. 
• The Depressions long-term impact on the politics of the three democracies, Britain, France and the USA. It delayed their rearmament programmes and created an international climate in which each of the three suspected the others of causing its financial and economic difficulties. It thus prevented any effective collaboration between them at the time when it was vital both to deter the aggressive nationalism in Japan and Germany and to deal with the global economic crisis. 

As international trade collapsed, the Great Powers erected tariff barriers and attempted to make themselves economically self-sufficient. The British and the French with their huge empires had a decisive advantage over the Germans, Italians and Japanese. 

2. What were Hitlers foreign policy aims and what had been achieved by 1935? 

The Foreign Policy of Hitlers Predecessors 1930-1933

In March 1930, Heinrich Brüning was appointed Chancellor of a minority government supported by the German Nationalist Party (DNVP). Although his successors, Franz Von Papen and General Von Schliecher had failed to revive the German economy and so prepared the way for Hitlers rise in power in January 1933. 

They had two large victories. The German government managed to persuade the Western democracies to abolish reparations at the Lausanne conference in July 1932. Also in the World Disarmament Conference which met in February 1932, the powers agreed to concede to Germany 'equality of rights' within a 'system which would provide security for all nations'. In November 1932, the German War Ministry finalised plans for large increases in military spending by 1938. 

Hitlers Long Term Aims

The tempo of the German campaign against Versailles quickened once Hitler came to power in 1933, although initially he seemed to pursue the same policy as his three predecessors but more vigorously and unconventionally. The was making Germany 'the greatest power in Europe from her natural weight by exploiting every opportunity that presented itself'. In Hitlers book 'Mein Kampf' written in 1924, Germany was to turn all its 'gaze towards the land in the east' which meant all land above Russia. There is a general consensus among historians that Hitler did intend to wage a series of wars which would ultimately culminate in a struggle for global hegemony (dominance). The key to understanding Hitlers foreign policy is that he combined 'consistency of aim with complete opportunities in method and tactics'. (he took the opportunities that presented themselves)

Hitlers Immediate Priorities

in 1933, Hitlers first priority was to consolidate the Nazi takeover of power and to rebuild Germanys military strength, this would eventually allow him to destroy what remained of the versailles system. At the same time, he had to be careful not to provoke an international backlash, therefore, he followed a cautious policy of avoiding risks and defusing potential opposition while gradually withdrawing Germany from any multilateral commitments such as being a member of the league of nations, which would prevent him from pursuing an independent policy. He hoped to isolate France by negotiating alliances with France and Britain. 

Hitlers immediate aim was to extricate Germany from the World disarmament Conference. He had skilfully reassured Britain and Italy of his peaceful intentions by signing in June 1933 the Four Power Pact, proposed by Mussolini, aimed at revising Versailles through joint agreement of the Great Powers. Hitler calculated correctly, as he knew the French would ever ratify the agreement.  

The German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact

Hitler agreed this pact despite opposition from the German Foreign Office, which wanted to maintain relations with Soviet Russia. The pact seriously weakened France's security system in eastern Europe and it had relied on its alliance with Poland to put pressure on Germany's eastern frontiers. Nevertheless, Germany still remained very vulnerable. Hitler was warned in August 1934 by a senior German diplomat, B.W. Von Bülow that: ' we shall for a long time yet be hopeless inferior to France in the military sphere.' 

The Attempt Nazi Coup In Austria, July 1934

Hitler was certainly aware of Germany's vulnerability, but over Austria he adopted a more provocative line. In June 1934, he met Mussolini in Venice, and tried to convince him that Austria should become a German satellite. When Mussolini rejected this, Hitler gave the Austrian Nazis strong unofficial encouragement to stage one month later a disastrously unsuccessful uprising in Vienna. Mussolini, determined to keep Austria as a buffer state between Italy and Germany, immediately mobilised troops on the Brenner frontier and forced Hitler to disown the coup. The incident brought about a sharp deterioration in German-Italian relations and appeared to rule out any prospect of an alliance.  

Germany Rearmament 1933-1935

Germany did begin to rearm as soon as Hitler seized power. In February Hitler announced a long-term plan for increased in the armed forces. It was his intention to mobilise the whole Germany economy and society for war. In July 1933, the decision was taken to create an independent Luftwaffe and a year later, the July programme was unveiled which envisaged the construction of some 17,000 airplanes. The majority of these were training planes, to familiarise pilots with flying so the Luftwaffe could be involved quickly. 

In December 1933, the Defence Ministry unveiled a new programme that aimed to create a peacetime army of 300,000 men. In March 1935, Hitler announced the reintroduction of conscription, despite the fears of his advisers that this would lead to French intervention. 

Even though naval rearmament wasn't high on Hitlers priorities, he hoped for at least a temporary alliance with Britain, a naval programme was drawn up which would produce a moderate-sized German fleet of eight battleship, three aircraft carriers, eight cruisers, 48 destroyers and 72 submarines by 1949. 

The Stresa Conference

In April the British, French and Italian heads of government met at Stresa to discuss forming a common front against Germany in view of Hitlers rejection of the clauses of Versailles limiting Germanys rearmaments. They both condemned German rearmament and resolved to maintain the peace settlements. Hitler, however, quickly launched a diplomatic offensive to reassure the powers of his peaceful intentions. Hitler prepared a series of non-aggressive pacts with Germanys neighbours and promised to observe Locarno and accept all overall limitation on armament. He also offered Britain an agreement limiting the German fleet to 35% of the total strength of the Royal Navy. 

3. How did the Great Powers react to the Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1935?

France

By 1934 Frnace had long since lost the diplomatic leadership of Europe which it had exercised in he immediate post-war years. Frances economy had been belatedly hit by the depression and its social cohesion (social unity of the country) was threatened by a wave of rioting sparked off in February 1934 by the exposure of a series of financial scandals, French society was deeply divided as the right wanted to negotiate with hitler and the left wanted to maintain good relations with Russia. 

Even if France had still possessed the will to intervene militarily in Germany, the Locarno Treaties prevented it from reoccupying the Rhineland. Neither could it reply on Poland after the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of Jan 1934. Frances response to the new Nazi Germany was therefore hesitant and sometimes contradictory. The French sought to contain Germany, as they had done since 1919, through a series of alliances and pacts but, like the British, they also tried to negotiate with hitler. 

Although ultimately Britain remained Frances major European partner, it was not ready in 1935 to commit itself to an alliance with France. The French therefore attempted the strengthen the little entente and negotiate agreements with Italy and Russia. However, this was by no means an easy task in 1933 in relations with both powers were strained. 

Franco-Italian Negotiations and the Rome Agreement 

In it attempts to negotiate an Italian alliance, France was greatly assisted by the abortive Nazi coup in Vienna, which more than anything convinced Mussolini that a military agreement with France was essential. 

In January 1935, both countries signed the Rome Agreement by which they undertook not to meddle in the affairs of their Balkan neighbours and to act together in the event of an unilateral German rearmament or another threat to Austrian independence. In June direct Franco-Italian military staff talks started to discuss joint action in the event of a German attack on Austria, Italy or France. 

Franco-Russian Negotiations

Parallel with these negotiations, talks were preceding between the French and the Russians. Paris did not show the same enthusiasm for a Russian alliance as it did for one with Italy. This was partly because soviet Russia had been regarded as scarcely less of a threat to the west than Germany and partly because it no longer had a common border with Germany. 

The French intended to enmesh Soviet Russia in an elaborate treaty of regional assistance or in other words an eastern European version of the Locarno Treaty, which would be signed and he Baltic states. This was to be strengthened by a separate Franco-Russian agreement which would associate Russia with the Locarno agreements in western Europe and France with the proposed eastern pact. 

But the whole plan came to nothing a both Germany and Poland refused to join. The Poles were refused to join. The Poles were more suspicious of the Russians than of the Germans. France had therefore little option but to pursue a mutual assistance pact with Soviet Russia alone. By May, The Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance had been signed, but Paris refused to follow up the treaty with detailed military staff talks between the two armies. The main aim of the pact was the restrain Russia from moving closer to Germany, as it had done on 1922 with the signature of the Rapallo Agreement. 

Franco-German Negotiations

Meanwhile the French government attempted to negotiate a settlement with Germany. Both in the winter of 1933-1934 and in the summer of 1935, immediately after the signature of the Franco-Soviet Treaty, attempts were made to open up to a Franco-German dialogue. These efforts were doomed as the French attempted to draw the German into negotiating agreements essentially aimed at preserving the Versailles system. Hitler was ready, when it suited him, to lower the political temperature through cordial diplomatic exchanges, but he was not ready to tolerate the restrictions with which French - and British - diplomacy was attempting to entangle him. 

Great Britain

Like France, Britain's reaction to Nazi Germany was conditioned by its military, economic and strategic vulnerability. in 1933 it faced a growing threat not only from Germany in Europe, but also from Japan in the Far East. Consequently, the main aim of British policy towards Germany was to blunt Hitlers aggression by continuing to modify the Treaty of Versailles peacefully while simultaneously drawing Germany back into the League where it could be tied down in multilateral agreements on security.

Britain also worked hard for an overall settlement with Germany. Despite the reintroduction of German constitution in March, Simon went to Berlin later in the month to explore the possibility of a comprehensive settlement with Germany involving German recognition of Austrian independence, its participation in an 'eastern Locarno' and return to the League. British ministers attended the Stresa meeting on April 8th, but they were determined at that stage not to join any alliances or pacts directed  against Germany as they was convince that the pre-1914 alliance system had been a major cause of the very war it was aimed to prevent. In June this policy seemed to be rewarded with success when the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed.

Italy

Mussolini who had extensive territorial aims in the Balkans and North Africa, at first attempted to maintain a special position as mediator between Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other, hoping that would in time bring him concessions from both sides. However, the increasing German threat to Austria began to convert Mussolini from a critic and potential revisionist of the Treaty of versailles to an upholder the territorial status quo. As early as August 1933 Mussolini met Engelbert Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, at Rimini and discussed arrangements for Italian military support in case of German intervention in Austria. 

Soviet Russia

Stalin, like the other European leaders, reacted cautiously to the Nazi takeover of power. His distrust of the West was at least as great as his fear of Nazi Germany. Consequently, even though he negotiated a defensive agreement with the French and sought collective security by joining the League of Nations in September 1934, he also attempted to maintain good relations with Germany despite such setbacks as the German-Polish Non-Agression Pact. 

The Soviet negotiations with the French in the spring of 1935 were also accompanied by a series of secret talks with the Germans, which mirrored the French tactics of trying for a settlement with Hitler in the summer of 1935 as an alternative to the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Soviet-Nazi talks continued intermittently right up to February 1936. Only with the ratification of the Franco-Soviet treaty of Mutual Assistance by the French Parliament were they broken off, but they were renewed in the summer of 1939.  

The USA

In 1933 there was considerable sympathy in the USA for the economic hardships that Germany was suffering as a result of the Depression, while both Britain and France were viewed with some suspicion on account of their huge colonial empires. However, with the coming to power of Hitler and beginning of the persecution of the Jews, public opinion in the USA began to become more hostile to Germany, but nevertheless US foreign policy remained firmly isolationist. 

In the Far East, the USA was alarmed by the Japanese occupation of Manchuria but did no more than make diplomatic protest. Indeed, the Temporary Neutrality Act of 1935, by empowering President Roosevelt to ban the supply of arms to all belligerents - whether aggressors or victims of aggression - in the event of the outbreak of war, strengthened the US policy of non-involvement. 

4. What Was the Impact of the Abyssinian Crisis?

Abyssinian Crisis
Mussolini had for a long time wanted to build up a large empire in North Africa which would have the added advantage of distracting his people from the impact of the Depression on the Italian economy. By 1932 he had begun to plan in earnest the annexation of Abyssinia. Not only would Abyssinia provide land for Italian settlers, but it would also connect Eritrea with Italian Somaliland and thus put most of the Horn of Africa under Italian control. In December 1934 a clash occurred between Italian and Abyssinian troops at small oasis of Wal-Wal, some 50 miles on the Abyssinian side of the border with Italian Somaliland. The following October the long expected invasion of Abyssinian began.

Failure of Anglo-French attempts to Compromise
Mussolini was convinced that neither Britain nor France would raise serious objections. In January 1935 Laval, the French Foreign Minister, had verbally promised him a free hand, while the British Foreign Office was desperate to avert the crisis either by offering Mussolini territorial compensation elsewhere or by helping to negotiate an arrangement, comparable to Britain's own position in Egypt, which would give Italy effective control of Abyssinia without formally annexing it.

Why couldn't they compromise?

The Scale and brutality of the Italian invasion confronted both the British and French governments with a considerable dilemma. The British government was facing an election in November 1935 and was under intense pressure from the electorate to support the League. In an unofficial peace ballot in June 1935 organised by the League of Nations Union, which was formed in 1918 to win public support for the League, 10 million out of 11 million replies backed the use of economic sanctions by the League in a case of aggression. In France, public opinion was more divided, with the left supporting the League and the right supporting Italy. However, both powers feared the diplomatic consequences al alienating Italy over Abyssinia. In particular, Britains persistent refusal to join France in guaranteeing the status quo in central and eastern Europe inevitably increased the importance for the French of their friendly relations with Italy.
On October 18th the League condemned the Italian invasion of Abyssinian, and voted for a gradually escalation programme of sanctions. In the meantime both Britain and France continued to search for a compromise settlement. In December Laval and the British Foreign Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare, produced a plan which involved placing some two-thirds of Abyssinia under Italian control. There was a strong possibility that it would have been acceptable to Mussolini, but it was leaked to the French press and an explosion of rage amongst the British public forced Hoares resignation and the dropping of the plan.
The failure of diplomacy did not then ensure vigorous action against Mussolini. The League put no embargo no oil experts to Italy, and Britain refused to close the Suez Canal to Italian shopping on the grounds that this might lead to war. Mussolini was thus able to step up his campaign and by may 1936 had overrun Abyssinia.

Consequences
The crisis was a crucial turning point into the 1930s. Not only did it irreparably weaken the league and provide Hitler with an ideal opportunity for the illegal remilitarisation of the Rhineland, but it also effectively destroyed the Franco-Italian friendship and ultimately replaced it with the Rome-Berlin 'Axis'. This eventually enabled Hitler in 1938 to absorb Austria without Italian opposition. The 'Axis' was also to threaten vital British and French lines of communication in the Mediterranean with the possibility of hostile naval action and thus seriously weaken their potential response to future German - or indeed Japanese - aggression.

5. Why was Hitler able to reoccupy the Rhineland in 1936?

The reoccupation of the Rhineland marked an important stage in Hitlers plan to make Germany strong again. The construction of strong fortifications there would enabled him to stop any French attempts to invade Germany. Hitler had originally planned to reoccupy the Rhineland in 1937, but a combination of the favourable diplomatic situation created the Abyssinian crisis and the need to distract domestic attention from German economic problems brought by the speed of the rearmament programme persuaded him to act in March 1936. In December 1935 the German army was ordered to start planning the reoccupation, while Hitler diplomats began to manufacture a legal justification for such action by arguing that the Franco-Soviet Paer was contrary to the Locarno agreement. Crucial to the success of his plan was the attitude of Italy.
Mussolini, isolated from the other Stresa Powers because of his Abyssinian policy, had little option but to reassure Germany that he would not co-operate with the British and French to enforce Locarno if german troops entered the Rhineland.
German troops marched into the Rhineland on March 7th 1936. In order to reassure France that they did not intend to violate the Franco-German frontier they were initially, at any rate, few in number and lightly equipped. So why did the French army not immediately intervene? The French general staff, which since the late 1920s had been planning for a defensive war against Germany based on the fortification of the Maginot Line on Frances eastern frontier, refused to invade the Rhineland unless they had full backing from the British.
The most British government was ready to do was to promise France that, in the event of an unprovoked German attack on French territory, it would send two division of troops across the channel. Essentially, British public opinion was convinced the Hitler was merely walking into 'his own back garden'.
The remilitarisation of the Rhineland was a triumph for Hitler, and, as an internal French Foreign Office memorandum of March 12th 1936 stressed, it marked a decisive shift in power from Paris to Berlin. 

6. What was the impact of the Spanish Civil war on international relations?

Civil War
The civil war in Spain was essentially a domestic matter which rapidly became an international issue threatening to involve the major powers in a European conflict. In began in July 1936 with a Nationalist revolt led by the army against the Spanish Republican government. When the rebels were defeated in a number of cities by the workers, both sides appealed to the international community for help. The Nationalist, led by general franco, looked to Germany and Italy, while the republicans approached Britain, France and Soviet Russia.

German and Italian Intervention
Hitler quickly agreed to provide a fleet on transport aircraft to fly Francos man across the Spain. He then followed this up with the dispatch of some 6000 troops. Hitler certainly wanted to stop spain becoming communist but he also wanted to distract the Western Powers so that he could continue to rear without the fear of intervention. He was also aware of the advantages of having a friendly government in Madrid which would not supply Germany with Spanish mineral resources but also in wartime possibly provide bases for German submarines.
Mussolini also agreed to assist Franco for the same mixture of ideological and strategic reasons: he hoped to defeat the left in Spain, gain a new ally in Franco, who might grant Italy a naval base on one of the Balearic islands, and 'strengthen' the Italian character by exposure to war.

The Non-Intervention Policy of Britain and France
With both Germany and Italy openly helping Franco there was a real danger of a European war, should France and Britain be drawn in on the Republican side. When the French prime minister, Léon Blum, whose power rested on a left-wing coalition, as first asked for help by the republic, he was tempted to give it, if only to defy potential allies of Germany a victory in Spain. However, two factors forced him to have second thoughts. The actual dispatch of French military aid to the republicans would have polarised French society, which was already deeply divided between left and right, and run the risk of plunging France into civil war of its own: and secondly, the British government came out strongly against intervention. the British ambassador in Paris even threatened neutrality should French assistance to the Republicans lead to war from Germany. Despite the strategic dangers for Britain's position in the Mediterranean in the event of a nationalist victory, the cabinet viewed the civil war as essentially a side issue which must not be allowed to prevent its continued search for lasting settlement with Germany. In addition, there were powerful voices within the Conservative party who actively sympathised with Franco.
In an attempt to prevent the war spreading, Britain and France proposed a non-intervention agreement. This was signed by the other European powers, but Germany and Italy ignored it and continued to assist Franco.

Soviet Intervention
The Republicans government, therefore had little options but to approach Soviet Russia for help. In September 1936 Stalins int hundreds of military advisers and large quantities of military equipment, while the Comintern was made responsible for recruiting brigades of international volunteers. Stalin, like Hitler, saw the civil war as a way of dividing his enemies.
A conflict between the Western Powers and Germany would certainly have suited Stalins policy, but he was also anxious to prevent Nationalist victory in Spain since this would strengthen the forced of international racism and make a german attack on the Soviet Union more likely. However, by early 1937, when he realised that the republicans could not win, he reduced the flow of arms to a level that was just sufficient to prolong the conflict. In this he was successful, as it was not until March 1939 that Franco at last occupied Madrid.

The Consequences of the Civil War
For the democracies that civil war could not have cone at a worse time. It polarised public opinion between right and left, threatened France with encirclement and cemented the Italian-German rapprochement. It may also have helped to convince the Soviet Union of the weakness of the West and prepare the way for the Nazi-Soviet Pact of September 1939. As with the Abyssinian crisis, it was undoubtably Germany who benefited most from the conflict since it diverted the attention of the powers from the conflict since it diverted the attention of the powers during the crucial period 1936-1937 from the Nazi rearmament programme.

7. Why and how did Japan, Germany and Italy draw closer together in the period 1936-1937?

The summer of 1936 was increasingly cordial relations between Berlin and Rome. While Britain pointedly refused to recognise the King of Italy as the 'emperor of Abyssinia', Germany rapidly did so. Hitler and Mussolini also co-operated in blocking a new British initiative to update the Locarno treaty. Italy's growing hostility towards Britain, France and especially the USSR, with whom until the Spanish Civil war it had enjoyed good relations, also ensured that it had to be more tolerant of Germany influence in Austria. In Jan 1936 Mussolini assured the German ambassador in rome that 'If Austria, as a formerly independant state, were... in practice to become a German satellite, he would have no objection'.

The October Protocols: The Rome-Berlin Axis
The understanding between Italy and Germany over Austria prepared the way for a German-Italian agreement, the October Protocols, which were signed in Berlin in October 1936. Mussolini announced this in a mass meeting on Milan in November 1st.

The Anti-Comintern Pact

Three weeks later Hitler overrode advice from his professional diplomats and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. This was more of a symbolic than practical importance as it was aimed against the Comintern rater than the Soviet Union itself, for Hitler, coming so soon after the Rome-Berlin Axis, the pact trumpeted to the world that Germany was no longer isolated, as it had appeared to be in the spring of 1935. In November 1937 this pact was further strengthened by Italy's accession.

Task 2 - The Countdown to War in Europe 1937-39

1. What was the significance of the Hossbach Memorandum in 1937?
On 5 November 1937 Hitler called a special meeting attended by his Commanders-in-Chief, Foreign ministers and War ministers. He stressed that his biggest aim was to acquire Lebensruam within Europe rather than colonies in Africa, at the latest by the period 1943-5, but indicated that he would move against Czechoslovakia and Austria before this date if France was distracted by either civil war or by hostilities with Italy.
At the Nuremberg trials after the war in 1946, the Allies claimed that the Hossbach Memorandum showed that Hitler had drawn up a detailed timetable for war. Others have argued that Hitler was warning his generals 'that a more adventurous and dangerous foreign policy was imminent'. It was significant that a month later General Jodl, the Chief of the Operation Staff, drew up plans for an offensive rather than defensive war against Czechoslovakia.

2. What was the impact of the Arms Race between 1936 and 1939? 
In 1935 the scale of German rearmament became clear, thus triggering an arms race with Britain and France. Learning from WW1, all three countries expected this war to be a long struggle, however most military experts still thought in terms of First World War tactics. The French built the Maginot line, an enormous series of concrete fortifications along their frontier with Germany, whilst the Germans built the Westwall along the east bank of the Rhine.
One lesson from the First World War was that the army needed so much equipment that the economy and the workforce had to be totally mobilised in order to supply them. The nation who could best supply their army would win the war.
Germany: 
Through raising taxes, government loans and cutting consumer expenditure, military expenditure quadrupled between 1937 -39. The pace of their military expansion created concern in France and Britain.
France: 
French rearmament caused considerable economic and social problems. Between 1936-38 the value of the franc had to be lowered three times to help pay for rearmament. The speed of their rearmament was slowed significantly by the weakness of their economy.
Britain: 
Rearmament caused considerable financial strain, however in 1936 a Four-Year Plan gave priority to the navy and airforce. This programme was accelerated in 1937, when Chamberlin became Prime Minister.

The German rearmament programme would not be completed until mid-1940s, however this would not stop Hitler waging a limited war against Czechoslovakia or Poland if they believed Britain and France would not get involved.
Although Britain and France wanted to avoid war, their rearmament programmes would be completed by 1939-40, so if a war was going to happen this would be the best time. Beyond this date both countries would find it hard to continue funding rearmament.

3. What were the main arguments for and against appeasement?
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was a realistic policy for the rulers of the large and vulnerable British empire. It was based on the assumption that a willingness to compromise would avoid conflict and thus protect the empire. He hoped to divert German expansion eastern Europe by offering Germany colonies in Africa. Chamberlain won over the French with this policy and by March 1938 he was ready to negotiate a package of colonial concessions with Berlin. However it failed to achieve any lasting, peaceful settlement.

For: 

• At the time Britain was facing a slow economic decline as well as their being global challenges facing the British Empire. 
• Chamberlain had to maintain a balance rearming and balancing the budget, so that if war came Britain would have enough money to buy vital materials and equipment from the USA.
• If the Empire was to be preserved, he had no other choice than to chose appeasement.  
• The British people wanted peace - they would not have supported a war in 1938.  
•  Many of Hitler's complaints appeared reasonable at the time - especially about the Treaty of Versailles.   
• Chamberlain wanted a strong Germany to serve as a barrier against expansion by communist Russia.     
• Britain's armed forces were not ready for a war, and they could not have helped Czechoslovakia anyway.    
• Many people admired Hitler. In 1938, the American magazine 'Time' declared him 'Man of the Year'.    
• Chamberlain remembered the slaughter of the First World War; he thought another war would destroy civilisation.

Against:

• It left Britain unprepared militarily to face the dictators. 
• It allowed Hitler to think that he could get away with things.
• His policy was weak because he failed to stand by it until the end. 
• Allying with Poland was a mistake as Britain had no moral reasons or self-evident interest in fighting a major war over Poland.
• Chamberlain should have allowed/encouraged Hitler to expand eastwards and attack the USSR.
• He could have tried to build a barrier against Hitler's expansion by seeking closer ties with France and other European countries sooner than March 1939.

4. How and why did Hitler achieve the Anschluss with Austria and the Occupation of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia in 1938? 

In November 1937, Hitler planned a scenario involving a French civil war or a `Franco-Italian war, in order to annex Austria and dismember Czechoslovakia with fear of international intervention. Although circumstances changed, he was still able to achieve these aims in 1938-9.

Anschluss 

The annexation of Austria had been a key aim in Nazi foreign policy. The crisis was triggered however when Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, requested an interview with Hitler. He then unexpectedly called for a referendum for a 'free and German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria'. Hitler quickly dropped his policy of gradual absorption of Austria and not only forced Schuschnigg to cancel the referendum but on March 12 ordered the German army to occupy Austria. He then decided to incorporate Austria into the Reich rather than install a satellite Nazi government in Vienna. By doing this Hitler had violated the Treaty of Versailles and invaded an independent state, even though the Austrian army did not resist. He had also put himself in a position to threaten Czechoslovakia.
Mussolini backed Hitler's decision to invade Austria, whilst, although they had no intention of going to war over Austria, Britain and France protested to Berlin. Britain hoped that the storm would eventually blow over and that talks could resume with Berlin on a package of possible colonial concessions. The aimed to distract Berlin from pursuing its ambitions in central Europe.

Sudetenland
With the invasion of Austria, Czechoslovakia was now surrounded on three sides by German territory. Hitler saw Czechoslovakia as a threat that would have to be eliminated, due to its alliances with both France and Russia. Czechoslovakia was a fragile state whose unity was threatened by its ethnically divided population (3 million Sudeten Germans and 2 million Slovaks). Hitler therefore instructed Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten German leader, to keep making demands for concessions that the Prague government would not be able to make if it wanted to preserve the unity of the Czechs.
Britain was unwilling to back the Czechs but realised that it may not be able to stay uninvolved from the consequences of a German attack. The French however had signed two treaties in 1924 and 1925 pledging it to assist the Czechs in the event of a threat to their common interests. However, in reality, the French were in no position for war.
On May 20-21 1938 the Czech government partially mobilised due to false rumours of an imminent German attack (The May Crisis). Hitler responded by stepping up his military preparations for an invasion set for October 1. In response, France and Britain increased their efforts to find a peaceful solution by putting pressure on the Czechs and Sudeten Germans to make concessions, whilst warning Hitler of the dangers of a general war. In early September, Beneš, the Czech Prime Minister, responded by granting Henlein's, the Sudeten German leader, demands.
On 12 September Hitler upped his campaign during a speech at the Nuremberg rally, where he attacked the Czechs and backed the Sudeten Germans. Chamberlain flew to meet with Hitler on the 15th at Berchtesgaden, where he agreed that Czechoslovakia should cede to Germany all areas that contained a German population of 50% or over. When they met again at Bad Godesberg Hitler demanded that German occupation of the Sudetenland should be sped up to be completed by 28 September, nor was it to be supervised by any international commission.
Hitler agreed to delay the invasion until 10 October, and consented, along with Britain, France and Italy, to guarantee what remained of the independence of Czechoslovakia and signed a declaration which affirmed the desire of Britain and Germany 'never to go to war with one another again'. The Munich Agreement was a triumph for Hitler as he had secured the Sudetenland however his aim of destroying the Czechs was stopped by an international guarantee.
On 6 March 1939, Germany was given the opportunity to finally dismember the Czechs, when they moved troops into Slovakia to crush local demands for independence, which the Nazis had helped to stir up. On 14 March Emil Hácha, the Czech president, travelled to Berlin where he was bullied into resigning and putting the fate of his country into 'the hands of the Fuhrer' The next day German troops occupied Prague and Slovakia was turned into a German Protectorate.

5. Why did Britain and France fail to prevent the invasion of Poland in September 1939? 
On 31 March 1939 Britain and France guaranteed Poland against a German attack. However both Britain and France lacked the military power to defend Poland and had already tactically written off eastern Europe as a German sphere of influence. The U-turn was caused by the German occupation of the Czech province of Bohemia, which clearly indicated that Hitler could not be trusted to respect treaties and guarantees. At the point the French economy was making a strong recovery and therefore a tougher policy towards Hitler seemed a realistic option.
After rumours that Hitler was about to occupy Romania, Britain attempted to contain Germany by negotiating a four-power pact with France, Russia and Poland, however this was not a practical policy due to Poland's suspicious view on Russia. However, after Hitler forced Lithuania to hand back Memel on 23 March, Poland was given an Anglo-French guarantee against a German attack on 31 March. Chamberlain hoped to reinforce this with a series of interlocking security pacts with other eastern European and Baltic states.
When, on 7 April, Mussolini invaded Albania, Britain and France guaranteed both Greece and Romania. In May Britain negotiated an agreement with Turkey for mutual assistance 'in the even of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area'. By July, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were gravitating towards the Anglo-French 'peace bloc'.
In October 1938, January and March 1939, Hitler unsuccessfully sounded out the Poles about the the return of Danzig, the construction of a road and rail link through the corridor and about joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, and in return they were offered land in the Ukraine. The Poles rejected this in March 1939. The Anglo-French guarantee of Poland proved to Hitler that Poland would have to be eliminated. As war with Poland now seemed inevitable, Hitler had to ensure support from the USSR. Britain and France also needed a pact with Russia to build up their 'peace front'. Thus putting Stalin in the position of being able to play off Hitler against Chamberlain and Daladier.
Negotiations between Russia, Britain and France began in April 1939, but both sides deeply mistrusted each other. Stalin demanded that Russia should be able to intervene in affairs of the small states along its western borders, however this was rejected outright by the British, as they believed that Russia would use the threat of Nazi indirect aggression as an excuse to seize territories for themselves. Stalin was also suspicious that Britain and France would put Russia in a position where it would be doing most of the fighting against Germany.
After negotiation with the Nazis Stalin was convinced that an agreement with Hitler would be preferable. With the decision made to go to war with Poland, the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed on 23 August. The pact committed both powers to neutrality towards each other and outlined the German and Russian spheres of interest in eastern Europe. This pact therefore made an attack on Poland much less risky for Hitler.

Task 3 - Key Debate 

To what extent was Chamberlain a 'guilty man'? 

Against 
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement made little sense. Hitler was prepared to use war to achieve his aims and therefore the correct policy would be to stand firm against him. Appeasement encouraged Hitler to make fresh demands; with each surrender Germany grew stronger and more dangerous. He also failed to stand by his policy until the end, thus weakening it further.
He is also criticised for allying with Poland as Britain had no moral obligation of self-evident interest to fight a major war over Poland. The German annexation of Poland would not necessarily have strengthened Germany, and would have simply brought it face to face with the USSR.
It is also argued that Chamberlain should have encouraged Hitler to expand eastwards, and
thus ultimately to fight the USSR. It is unlikely that Germany would have defeater the USSR and therefore there was little threat towards Britain and France. It is also suggested that Chamberlain might have 'tried to build a barrier to Hitler's expansion', through seeking closer ties with France and other European countries, sooner than March 1939.
In the end Chamberlain failed as in September 1939 Britain went to war. He admitted himself that everything he had hoped for had 'crashed in ruins'.

For
Chamberlain did not see appeasement as a surrender but as a positive effort to achieve a settlement. Like many in Britain he felt that Germany had some legitimate grievances and justice did not become injustice because it was demanded by a dictator. The only other alternative to appeasement was war - for which Britain was unprepared. 750,000 lives had been lost in WW1 and another war would have significantly damaged the British economy. He realised that he was not in a position to get rid of Hitler and thus had little alternative but to work with him.
Chamberlain's policies failed but the situation in September 1939, could have been much worse. Britain and France were firmly allied and stronger than in 1938. They had more tanks and troops than Germany and would soon have more planes. Their economic strength was much stronger and they had a useful ally in Poland. Whereas in 1939 Hitler was isolated and both Italy and Japan were not prepared to risk war with Britain. Chamberlain was more helpless than a 'guilty man'. He believed appeasement could work, and it was not his mistakes, but Hitler's ambitions that were responsible for the outbreak of war.